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In 2000 the American Law Institute (ALl) published a landmark study
of family dissolution.1 This article discusses one aspect of that proposal,
the default custodial arrangement proposed in chapter 2, called the Approximation Rule, and its meaning and relation to other developments in
child custody.
I. THE PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION

The American Law Institute Principles of Family Dissolution are the
product of over a decade of work by one of the most prestigious American
legal institutions, the American Law Institute, whose Restatements of the
*
Marygold S. Melli is Voss-Bascom Professor of Law Emerita at the University
of Wisconsin Law School and an Affiliate of the Institute for Research on Poverty at the
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1.

AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS

AND RECOMMENDATION (2000) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES].
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Law have been enormously influential in the development of American
law. The Principles of Family Dissolution should be no less important.
They are probably the most sweeping proposal for family law reform in
more than a quarter of a century.2
The Principles of Family Dissolution is not a traditional Restatement. 3
It is an attempt to recommend the "best practices" and to reflect the most
current thinking about the direction of family law and the optimal role of
the law in one of the most basic and vital areas of the law-that governing
the family-as it changes and adapts to 21st century social conditions. It is
a comprehensive treatment-over 1000 pages-of the full range of issues
that arise when family relationships dissolve. It deals with the division of
property, with what traditionally has been called alimony or maintenance
and is now dubbed "compensatory spousal payments" in the Principles,
with the status on dissolution of unmarried cohabitants, whether they are
same sex or heterosexual, and with agreements between parties-premarital, marital, and at the time of dissolution. Chapters 2 and 3, which
comprise over half of the volume, deal with post-divorce living arrangements for children and their post-divorce support.4
Chapter 2 covers the issue of custody and is entitled "The Allocation
of Custodial and Decision-making Responsibility for Children." This article focuses on chapter 2's proposed standard to guide the court in the case
of a dispute about custody. The standard is called the "approximation rule"
because it directs the court to allocate custodial responsibility so that the
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates
the proportion of time each parent spent performing care-taking functions 5
2.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act promulgated by the Commissioner on
Uniform State Laws in 1970 was the last proposal for a major revision of the laws of divorce. It proposed no-fault divorce. 9A U.L.A. Pts. I & 11 (2004-2005).
3.
It is also, in a sense, a historical event for the ALI because it marks the first time
that the ALI has addressed the subject of Family Law.
4.
Chapters 2 and 3 treat the children of married and unmarried parents similarly.
However, this discussion focuses on children of divorce. Therefore, the term used is postdivorce.
5.
Care taking functions are listed in § 2.03(5) and include:
(a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing the child's
bedtime and wake-up routines, caring for the child when sick or injured,
being attentive to the child's personal hygiene needs including washing,
grooming, and dressing, playing with the child and arranging for recreation, protecting the child's physical safety, and providing transportation;
(b) directing the child's carious developmental needs, including the acquisition of motor and language skills, toilet training, self-confidence,
and maturation;
(c) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners, assigning and supervising chores, and performing other tasks that attend to the child's
needs for behavioral control and self-restraint;
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for the child prior to the parents' separation. However, before engaging in
a full discussion of the approximation rule, it is helpful to describe the manner in which the Principles treat parental decision-making for children and
their emphasis on planning and agreement.
II.

PARENTAL DECISION-MAKING

As the title to chapter 2 implies, the ALl has divided the concept of
custody into (1) the decision-making authority of parents and (2) the residential arrangements for the child. Traditionally, custody was a unitary
concept. The parent awarded custody was the one with whom the child
resided and who made all decisions about the child and his future. However, with increasing frequency, American states have made the distinction
that the ALI has made and separated the two parental functions, differentiating between residential care for the child and decision-making for the
child.6
Section 2.09 of the Principles divides decision-making between dayto-day decisions and significant life decisions. Day-to-day decisions are to
be made by the parent who has the custodial care of the child at the time.7
Significant life decisions include decisions regarding the child's education
and health care. Section 2.09(1) provides that these decisions may be allocated to one parent or to both parents jointly. The Principles encourage the
use of shared decision-making and provide that the court shall presume that
an allocation of decision-making responsibility to both parents is in the
child's best interests. 8 On this issue of shared decision-making, the Principles reflect the approach of an increasing number of states.9 With the sepa(d) arranging for the child's education, including remedial or special
services appropriate to the child's needs and interests, communicating
with teachers and counselors, and supervising homework;
(e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal
relationships with peers, siblings, and other family members;
(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical follow-up, and home
health care;
(g) providing moral and ethical guidance;
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member, babysitter, or other
child-care provider or facility, including investigation of alternatives,
communication with providers, and supervision of care.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, §2.03(5).
See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 245.
6.
7. Id. at § 2.09(3).
8. Id. at 236.
Joan B. Kelley, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 The Future of Children
9.
121, 124 (1994). But shared decision-making, or joint legal custody, as it is usually called,
has its critics. See Herma Hill Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the
Gender Wars, 36 FAM. L.Q. 27, 38 (2000).
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ration of decision-making and residential care, parents may share equally
the decision-making authority for their child, but the child may live primarily with one parent; usually the mother. This custodial arrangement may be
the fastest growing post-dissolution arrangement in the United States.10
The Principles recognize that parents are not always going to agree.
The comment to section 2.09 notes that "decision-making authority may be
allocated as a whole, or by separate areas."'" Therefore, parents can share
decision-making, but if there is an area about which parents have divergent
12
views, the court can appoint one parent as decisionmaker.
III. PARENTAL AGREEMENT
The ALI Principles on Responsibility for Children promote two other
important values for the process of family dissolution: parental agreement
and planning. The Principles foster parental planning for the future of their
children by requiring that a parent who seeks custodial or decision-making
responsibility-or both parents together-file a detailed parenting plan including information on past parenting practices, a description of the employment and child-care schedule of the parents
and a schedule of the
13
child's school and extra-curricular activities.
The Principles place high value on parental agreement. Most postdissolution child custody arrangements are negotiated and agreed upon by
the parties. However, the law usually requires court approval, and that approval has always been predicated on a finding that the arrangement is in
the best interest of the child. 14 The ALl Principles depart from the tradi10.
A California study of 908 divorcing families who filed for divorce between
September 1984 and March 1985 reported that the outcome was joint legal custody in 79%
of the cases. See Robert H. Mnookin et al., Private Ordering Revisited: What Custodial
Arrangements Are Parents Negotiating?, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 37, 7172 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990).
In Wisconsin, data collected by the Child Support Demonstration Project
showed that from 1980 to 1992 joint legal custody increased from 18% to 81%. Marygold
S. Melli, Patricia R. Brown & Maria Cancian, Child Custody in a Changing World: A Study
of Post Divorce Arrangements in Wisconsin, 1997 ILL. L. REV. 773, 778 (1997).

Figures

from Wisconsin for cases that entered the court system between July 2000 and June 2001
show that 86.8% of the cases involved joint legal custody. Id.
11.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 238.
.12.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.09, cmt. a at 237.
13.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.05, at 143.
14.
The law has seen the decision at divorce as belonging to the court. Unlike other
court disputes, the parties to a divorce cannot 'settle out of court.' They must bring their
proposed settlement to the court for its review; in the case of an agreement on custody the
formal role of the court is to determine whether the custodial agreement is in the best interest
of the child. Traditionally, the law has viewed divorce as an unusual social phenomenon
that required judicial monitoring. Parents who had made countless important lifestyle and
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tional approach and require that the court approve a parenting plan agreed
to by the parents, unless it finds that the plan would be harmful to the child
or is not knowing or voluntary.' 5 The comment to section 2.06 notes:
The approach to parental agreements taken in these Principles assumes that courts have neither the time nor the resources to give meaningful review to all parental agreements. Even if greater time and resources were available,
court review is unlikely to uncover concrete evidence that
the agreement is not in the interests of the child, particularly in the face of a united front by the parents, or to lead
to a better agreement than the parents have reached on their
own. This section also assumes that a plan to which parents agree is more likely to succeed than one that has been
ordered by the court over the objection of one or both parents.16
IV. RESTRUCTURING CUSTODY DECISIONS
When parents cannot agree on a custodial arrangement, the Principles
7
faced the problem of choosing a rule to decide the disputed cases.1 There
were three choices in existing law: (1) the traditional best interest of the
child rule, (2) the primary caretaker preference, and (3) the joint custody
preference.
The traditional best interest of the child rule has been the standard
guide for custody decisions since the early 20th century. Students of family
law have long agreed that it is too indeterminate to be a reliable guide to
deciding child custody cases. 18 Most states qualify the standard with a list
health decisions for their children, protected from outside interference except in instances of
abuse or neglect, were seen as incapable of making decisions as to their custody at divorce
without judicial review. Marygold S. Melli, Toward a Restructuringof Custody DecisionMaking at Divorce: An Alternative Approach to the Best Interests of the Child, in

PARENTHOOD INMODERN SOCIETY (John Ecklaar & Peter Sarcevic eds., 1993).
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.06, at 155.
15.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 156.
16.
The rule that governs in the case of a dispute is equally important to the negoti17.
ated cases because the parties negotiate knowing the rule that will apply if they do not settle.
Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
See, e.g., David Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Dis18.
putes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477,481 (1984); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168, 74 (1984);
Robert Cochran, The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests of the Child at
Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretakerand Joint Custody Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1985); Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: JudicialFunctions in the
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of things that the court should consider as to the best interest of the child,
but these items have clearly not made the result more predictable. Lack of
predictability encourages litigation, which is widely believed not to be in
the best interest of the child. The ALl sought a more determinate guide.
The primary caretaker preference received a good deal of scholarly
comment in the 1980s and was adopted in two states, West Virginia and
Minnesota. However, it is no longer used in either jurisdiction. It grew out
of a West Virginia case, Garska v. McCoy, 19 which defined a primary caretaker as the "parent who, until the initiation of the divorce proceeding has
been primarily responsible for the caring and nurturing of the child."2 ° Although it was stated in gender neutral terms, it was considered to favor
mothers. Therefore, in Minnesota, the state legislature adopted legislation
overruling it. 2 1 However, the biggest problem with the rule was that it apparently resulted in more, not less, custody litigation as parents argued over
who had been the primary caretaker.22
The third possible option considered by policymakers when parents
cannot agree on post-divorce living arrangements for their children is a
presumption of joint custody, i.e., an arrangement for parental sharing of
child care and residence. The interest in joint custody dates back to the
1980s when the issue of increasing the post-divorce role of fathers became
the focus of father's rights groups, who often sought "joint custody," a term
that was not clearly defined. Originally, it apparently referred to equal time
with both parents but, increasingly, the term refers to amounts of time that
are substantial but, nevertheless, less than half time. An unequal division of
shared time differs from traditional visitation in that it implies more time
than the 15-20% time usually allowed for visitation and, more importantly,
it is qualitatively different because it involves overnights with the lessertime parent.
The push by fathers' rights groups for joint custody has been very controversia 23 and has been opposed by women's groups for two reasons: (1)
some have seen it as an attempt to reduce the amount of child support by
promising a commitment to share the care for the child which is either
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 256 (1975); Mary Ann Glendon,
Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L.
REV. 1165, 1181 (1986); Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four Year Experiment With the PrimaryCaretakerPreference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427 (1990).
19.
278 S.E.2d 357 (W.Va. 1981).

20.
21.

Id. at 358.
Crippen, supra note 18, at 439.

22.
Bruce Ziff, The Primary Caretaker Presumption: CanadianPerspectives on an
American Development, 4 INT'L. J.L. & FAM. 186 (1990).

23.
One observer has characterized the controversy as "gender wars." Kay, supra
note 9, at 38.
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short-lived or disregarded completely 24 and (2) others have been concerned
about the existence of domestic violence.25 Although most states have not
26
adopted a preference or presumption of joint custody, the interest in joint
custody has resulted in a dramatic shift in public policy dealing with custodial arrangements from a presumption that the best interest of the child usually mandates the mother sole custody to actively promote post-divorce
relationships with both parents.
V.

DECIDING CUSTODY CASES UNDER THE APPROXIMATION

RULE

Given the three choices outlined above, the Principles decided against
all three and chose a rule called the approximation rule, which was first
28 Scott sugproposed in a 1992 article by Professor Elizabeth S. Scott.
gested that post-divorce custody arrangements ought to approximate what
the parents did in the marriage. Therefore, in a contested case, custody
would be allocated so that the amount of time that the child will spend with
each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent spent in caring
for the child during the marriage.
By directing the attention of the court and the parties to the facts of
pre-divorce family arrangements, the approximation rule avoids some of the
major problems associated with the traditional best interest standard. That
standard effectively asks the court to predict the future as to what custodial
arrangement for the child, and under what conditions, will be in the child's
best interest and will ensure that the child will grow and develop properly.
Instead, as the commentary to the ALl Principles points out, the approximation rule requires a judicial inquiry of a traditional type, for which the
courts are better prepared, into the facts of a past occurrence, i.e., the way
The Principles reflect this concern. Section 3.08 on Determining the Child24.
Support Obligations of Dual Residential Parents provides that the child support award
should be "readily convertible to a single-residence child-support award" because "there is
frequently little relationship between the de jure award of residential responsibility and de
facto residence." ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note I, § 3.08(3), at 482.
Helen Rhoades & Susan B. Boyd, Reforming Custody Laws: A Comparative
25.
Study, 18 INT'L J. OF LAW, POL'Y AND FAM. 119 (2004); Helen Rhoades, The Rise and Rise

of Shared ParentingLaws: A Critical Reflection, 19 CAN. J. FAM. L. 75 (2002).
Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALl
26.
Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & LAW 5, 21 (2002).
The Principles reflect this trend by providing in § 2.02 that one of the objectives
27.
of chapter 2 is to serve the child's best interests by facilitating several objectives, including
"meaningful contact between the child and each parent." AL PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, §
2.08.
Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism,Parental Preference and Child Custody, 80 CAL.
28.
L. REV. 615 (1992).

29.

ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.08.
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in which parents shared care-taking functions in the pre-divorce family. It
reduces the need
to require expert testimony about such matters as the
child's emotional state or developmental needs, the parents' relative abilities, and the strength of their emotional
relationships to the child. Avoiding expert testimony is desirable because such testimony, within an adversarial context, tends to focus on the weakness of each parent and thus
undermines the spirit of cooperation and compromise necessary to successful post-divorce custodial arrangements.3 °
Finally, court reliance on past care-taking as a guide to reaching a decision should reduce strategic and manipulative behavior on the part of parents as well as the incentive to litigate child custody issues.
By focusing on past care-taking in the intact family, the Principles of
Family Dissolution also avoided the need to make a judgment about
whether the post-divorce custody arrangement should be guided by one of
the two determinate rules advocated by different groups and discussed earlier: the primary caretaker preference or the shared parenting presumption.
Instead, as Katharine Bartlett, the reporter for chapter 2 on custodial and
decisionmaking responsibilities, has noted, the Principles leave the choice
to the parents during marriage:
In effect, it amounts to a primary caretaker presumption
when one parent has been exercising a substantial majority
of the past caretaking, and it amounts to a joint custody
presumption when past caretaking has been shared equally
in the past. It responds to all variations and combinations
of past caretaking patterns between those two poles, declining to impose some average, idealized family form on all
families and instead favoring solutions that roughly approximate the caretaking shares each parent assumed before the divorce or before the custody issue arose. 3'
VI. TRANSLATING PAST-CARETAKING INTO POST-DIVORCE LIVING

Section 2.08 clearly recognizes the problems faced by a court in determining how to apportion the time that a child spends with two parents
30.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.08, cmt. b at 182.
31.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the American Law
Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the Individual Child's Best
Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467, 480 (1999).
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who no longer live together, based on what those parents had done when
32
the family was intact. It provides a list of detailed objectives that the
32.

Section 2.08 provides in full:
(1) Unless otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents under § 2.06, _
the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of
custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the
child prior to the parents' separation or, if the parents never lived together, before the filing of the action, except to the extent required under
§ 2.11 or necessary to achieve one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to permit the child to have a relationship with each parent
which, in the case of a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who
has performed a reasonable share of parenting functions,
should be not less than a presumptive amount of custodial time
set by a uniform rule of statewide application;
(b) to accommodate the firm and reasonable preferences of a
child who has reached a specific age, set by a uniform rule of
statewide application;
(c) to keep siblings together when the court finds that doing so
is necessary to their welfare;
(d) to protect the child's welfare when the presumptive allocation under this section would harm the child because of a gross
disparity in the quality of the emotional attachment between
each parent and the child or in each parent's demonstrated
ability or availability to meet the child's needs;
(e) to take into account any prior agreement, other than one
under § 2.06, that would be appropriate to consider in light of
the circumstances as a whole, including the reasonable expectations of the parties, the extent to which they could have reasonably anticipated the events that occurred and their significance, and the interests of the child;
(f) to avoid an allocation of custodial responsibility that would
be extremely impractical or that would interfere substantially
with the child's need for stability in light of economic, physical, or other circumstances, including the distance between the
parents' residences, the cost and difficulty of transporting the
child, each parent's and the child's daily schedules, and the
ability of the parents to cooperate in the arrangement;
(g) to apply the Principles set forth in § 2.17(4) if one parent
relocates or proposes to relocate at a distance that will impair
the ability of a parent to exercise the presumptive amount of
custodial responsibility under this section;
(h) to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the child.
(2) In determining the proportion of caretaking functions each parent
previously performed for the child under Paragraph (1), the court should
not consider the division of functions arising from temporary arrangements after the parents' separation, whether those arrangements are consensual or by court order. The court may take into account information
relating to the temporary arrangements in determining other issues under
this section.
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court should seek to achieve in allocating custodial responsibility. These
include: permitting the child to have a relationship with each parent, considering the child's wishes about the custodial arrangement, keeping siblings together if the court finds that it "is necessary to their welfare," and
protecting the child from a custodial arrangement that would be harmful
because the child's emotional attachment is to only one parent or one parent
does not have the ability or availability to meet the child's needs.
In spite of these detailed objectives, the Principles do not give much
direction to the court on how to order the arrangement of daily living or
how to apportion the time that each parent has with the child. But it is almost certain that using past caretaking as the standard will result in increased shared parenting.
Elizabeth Scott, who proposed that post-divorce arrangements be
grounded in past relationships, has observed that under traditional sole custody arrangements, fathers had been relegated to more distant parental roles
than they have in most intact families, a result that they resented. She saw
the approximation rule as providing for more parental sharing than traditional sole custody had provided. She also hoped that basing judgments at
divorce on past conduct might encourage more equal sharing during marriage.33
In fact, a direction to the court to approximate the pre-divorce family
living pattern may be a direction to ordering shared parenting. Parental
attitudes and living patterns in the 21st century have been changing. Fathers no longer see their role limited to that of a bread-winner, as that role is
now often shared with a wife in a dual-earner household. Fathers are becoming more involved in child caring-from attendance at birthing, to quieting the baby at church services, to changing diapers. An examination of
parental roles in the pre-divorce family will focus on shared parenting in
many families.

(3) If the court is unable to allocate custodial responsibility under Paragraph (1) because there is no history of past performance of caretaking
functions, as in the case of a newborn, or because the history does not
establish a sufficiently clear pattern of caretaking, the court should allocate custodial responsibility based on the child's best interests, taking
into account the factors and considerations that are set forth in this Chapter, preserving to the extent possible this section's priority on the share
of past caretaking functions each parent performed.
(4) In determining how to schedule the custodial time allocated to each
parent, the court should take account of economic, physical, and other
practical circumstances, such as those listed in Paragraph (1)(f).
33.
See Scott, supra note 28, at 656-72 (discussing societal changes with respect to
gender norms and the effect of such changes on custody arrangements).
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VII. THE APPROXIMATION RULE AS SHARED PARENTING: WOULD IT
MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

If the ALl had acknowledged that the approximation rule might result
in more post-divorce shared parenting would it have made a difference? I
suggest that it might have in two areas: (1) the investigation of issues related to shared parenting and (2) the determination of child support in
shared parenting arrangements.
A.

INVESTIGATION OF ISSUES RELATED TO SHARED PARENTING

The ALl could have addressed more adequately three issues of importance in the area of shared parenting. First, the ALl might have offered
some important background for jurisdictions considering adopting the approximation rule by analyzing and assessing the research on shared parenting and its effects on children. One thoughtful article discussing the Principles states: "Because of its proportionate allocation provision, the approximation rule envisions substantial degrees of shared parenting after divorce
and implicitly assumes that such shared custodial arrangements will be
beneficial or at least not harmful to children. 34 The article reviews some
of what we know about shared parenting and suggests areas of further
study. The fact is that over the last quarter century we have developed a
fair amount of knowledge about shared parenting. If the ALl had sorted
and analyzed that data with the same care and intelligence it devoted to
other issues, it would have been very helpful to any assessment of the approximation rule.
Secondly, the ALl could have explored patterns of time sharing used
by divorced parents to give parents some help and guidance on which arrangements work most effectively. 35 Time sharing patterns vary from several days a week with each parent to alternating weeks or months. One
arrangement that works for some is alternating half years with each parent
and traditional visitation with the other parent during that time. Parents
need as much guidance as possible in this relatively uncharted area.
Finally, if the ALl had clearly recognized that it was proposing a
course that might result in more shared parenting orders, the Principles
could have specifically examined the dangers of domestic violence in
shared parenting arrangements. The ALl has identified the problem of do34. Robert F. Kelly & Sharon L. Ward, Allocating Custodial Responsibilities at
Divorce: Social Science Research and the American Law Institute's Approximation Rule, 40
FAM. CT. REv. 350, 351 (2002).
The Australian government has studied patterns of post-divorce arrangements to
35.
learn what parents are doing post-separation. See Bruce Smyth (ed.), PARENT-CHILD
CONTACT AND POST-SEPARATION PARENTING ARRANGEMENTS (2004).
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mestic violence in general, and includes several provisions in the Principles
dealing with the issue. 36 These provisions require the courts to make efforts
to identify domestic violence and to order appropriate protective measures
and to consider it when ordering-or not ordering-mediation. But it
would have been helpful to know that the ALl had given the issue of domestic violence in shared parenting the careful scrutiny it gave other issues.
B.

THE DETERMINATION OF CHILD SUPPORT IN SHARED PARENTING ARRANGEMENTS

If the ALT had acknowledged that the approximation rule would result
in increased amounts of shared-time parenting, probably in the 20-40%
range, it might have developed a child support formula more responsive to
shared parenting needs. The AL addresses the issue of child support in
chapter 3 of the Principles. In response to concerns about the well-being of
children in the custody of the maternal parent, the ALI has developed a
sophisticated and complex formula for determining child support in cases
where one parent is the primary custodian. 37 In developing that formula,
36.

The Principles define domestic violence as
the infliction of physical injury, or the creation of a reasonable fear
thereof, by a parent or a present or former member of the child's household, against the child or another member of the household. Reasonable
action taken by an individual for self-protection, or the protection of another individual, is not domestic violence.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 2.03(7).
The Principles further provide that
[t]he court should have a process to identify cases in which there is
credible information that child abuse, as defined by state law, or domestic violence as defined in § 2.03(7), has occurred. The process should
include assistance for possible victims of domestic violence in complying with Paragraph (2), referral to appropriate resources for safe shelter,
counseling, safety planning, information regarding the potential impact
of domestic violence on children, and information regarding civil and
criminal remedies for domestic violence. The process should include a
system for ensuring the court review mandated in § 2.06(2) when there
is credible information that child abuse or domestic violence has occurred.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 205(3).
37.
The Principles, like all American jurisdictions, determine child support with a
formula or guideline that is based on the number of children in the family and the income of
the parents. It presupposes a custodial parent with whom the child lives, and a noncustodial
parent who has varying degrees of contact with the child and who pays child support.
Almost all of the state guidelines are based on the theory that a parent ought to
continue to spend the same amount on a child as that parent spent when the family lived
together. This expenditure is determined by estimating how much a two-parent family
would increase spending to cover the addition of a child to the family. It is called the marginal expenditure or continuity of expenditure formula. In chapter 3, the ALI is critical of
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the ALI was cognizant of the expense that the non-residential parent has in
having contact--or visitation-with the child. The ALl estimates visitation
contact at 15-20% time, and adjusts the child support formula accordingly.38
When parents share residential time with children and the amount of
time spent with the lesser-time parent reaches a certain percentage of time,
usually ranging between 20-40%, most states provide for some reduction in
the child support payment to recognize the additional expenses to that parent of increased activity with the child.39 Usually the child support rule
specifies the time in "overnights."
The ALl Principles fit into this pattern. Section 3.02 defines residential responsibility as overnight responsibility for a child. Section 3.08 provides that when parents have substantially equal residential responsibility
for a child-which the Reporter's Notes 40 suggests is at least 35% timethe amount of child support paid to the greater time parent should be reduced by that percentage. This results in a large reduction-35% or
more-in the child support payment 4 and is known as the "cliff effect."
The ALl recognizes this result but offers no solution except to suggest that
it is appropriate where the child is in the care of the lesser-time parent be42
tween 35-50% of the time.
these guidelines, finding that they are fair to children only when the income of both parents
is about equal. But an equal income situation is not common. In fact, in the majority of
cases, the income of the custodial parent is less than that of the noncustodial parent. In these
cases the ALl finds the child receives less than a fair amount. Therefore, the ALl child
support formula in chapter 3 is intended to provide the child a standard of living not grossly
inferior to that of either parent. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.04.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, § 3.05, cmt. b at 446.
38.
There is currently debate about whether the basic child support award calculated
by the states ignores the cost to the lesser-time parent of spending time with the child, or
assumes that the amount of the award took into consideration contact by the lesser time
parent. The ALl formula is explicit about the fact that the cost to the lesser time parent
should be factored into the child support formula, estimating that the lesser time parent
spends about 15-20% time with the child. See William V. Fabricius & Sanford L. Braver,
Non-Child support Expenditures by NonresidentialDivorced Fathers, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 321
(2003); J.C. Venohr & Robert G. Williams, The Implementation and Periodic Review of
Child Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 7 (1999); Irwin Garfinkel et al., Visitation and
Child Support Guidelines, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 342 (2004); Marygold S. Melli, Guideline
Review: Child Support and Time Sharing by Parents,33 FAM. L.Q. 219 (1999).
Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, The Economics of Shared Custody:
39.
Developing an EquitableFormulafor Dual Residence, 31 Hous. L. REV. 543, 554 (1994).
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 487.
40.
To help understand the amount of reduction, I asked my colleagues at the Insti41.
tute for Research on Poverty to work out this amount of reduction, using $38,000 income for
fathers and $22,000 for mothers (the mean income for parents in the IRP Survey for 2002).
The reduction at 36% was from $7,812 a year to $6,300, or a reduction of $1,512.
ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note I at 487.
42.
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In the ALl formula-as in some states-the impact of the cliff effect is
lessened by multiplying the amount of the child support award before the
reduction for the shared time by 1.5. This is explained as a recognition of
the increased cost of dual residence. There is no doubt that providing two
homes for a child with parents who do not live together is more expensive
than one home for an intact family, but whether that increased cost is borne
equally by the parents or whether it warrants multiplying the child support
by 1.5 is not clear from the Principles.43
Section 3.08(3) also provides that "a dual residence child support
award should be readily convertible to a single residence child support
award in the event that, desgite the dual residence order, the child resides
primarily with one parent."' The commentary notes that "[t]here is frequently little relationship between the de j ure award of residential responsibility and de facto residence. 45
There are two problems with the ALI treatment of child support in
shared-parenting situations. In the first place, it does not address the issue
of shifting costs and the additional expense when the lesser-time parent has
residential care in the 20-35% range. 46 This is puzzling because the Principles carefully calculate and account for the costs of visitation at 20% or less
time. In the 20-35% range, if the lesser-time parent is the lower income
parent,47 the result may be just as detrimental to the child as a decrease to
the primary parent.
Secondly, the ALl has made no effort to address the cliff effect in
cases where it reduces child support at the 35-40% range of residential care.
The large amount of reduction that gives rise to the cliff effect is unfair for
two reasons. First, by counting the total time with the child, the lesser-time
43.
For a discussion of the costs of shared custody and the allocation of those costs
see Melli & Brown, supra note 39, at 554.
44.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 482.
45.
Id. at 487. There is a widespread assumption that shared time arrangements are
unstable and that father custody does not comply with the award. The most frequently cited
study for this concerns parents in the process of divorce. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT
H. MNOOKIN, DIvIDING THE CHILD, 167, 170 (1992).
A study in Wisconsin of about 300 families with approximately equal shared
time found that two years after the divorce, 75% of fathers cared for the child approximately
half-time. MARGARET L. KRECKER, PATRICIA R. BROWN, MARYGOLD S. MELLI & L. WIMER,

CHILDREN'S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS IN DIVORCED WISCONSIN FAMILIES WITH SHARED
PLACEMENT, IRP Special Report 83, Inst. for Research on Poverty, Univ. of Wisc.-Madison

(2002).
46.
For a discussion of shifting costs, see Marygold S. Melli, Guideline Review:
Child Support and Time Sharing by Parents,33 FAm. L.Q. 219 (1999).
47.
In a Wisconsin study, 39% of the lesser time parents in unequal time sharing
had lower incomes than the greater time parent. Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown,
The Economics of Shared Custody: Developing an Equitable Formula for Dual Residence,
31 Hous. L. REv. 543, 553 (1994).
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parent receives double credit for the time calculated in the basic child support order for visitation-approximately 20%. Second, the formula provides for a sharp reduction from just below to just above 35% time. By
increasing the amount of time spent in residential care by 5%, a lesser-time
parent can reduce child support by 40%.
As pointed out earlier, the ALl attempts to ease the effects of the cliff
effect by increasing the child support award by 50%, but the rationale for
that is probably questionable. One sensible option, that the ALl apparently
did not consider, would reduce child support only for the time above the
threshold, i.e., the point in time at which the formula reduces child support.
This approach, which is used by several states, 48 is more fair to the primary
parent and also does not result in a big gap between the time just below and
above the threshold.
VIII.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Chapter 2 of the Principles on Custodial and Decision-making Responsibility for Children appears to be favorably received. The concept of
basing future custody arrangements on past conduct is a very useful addition to the jurisprudence of custody law. It also is a viable and equitable
solution to the important question of how to enable both parents to remain
involved with their children after divorce.
Comment by feminists, who have frequently opposed the joint custody
proposals favored by fathers' rights groups, has been commendable.49
Margaret Brinig has observed that under the Approximation Rule "no parent becomes a sole custodian, no one is relegated to visitation., 50 Herma
Hill Kay has noted that "[i]f joint custody was the handiwork of men; the
most recent approach ... was crafted by women. 51
Finally, this chapter of the Principles on parental decision-making and
custodial responsibility is the only chapter of the Principles of Family Dissolution to have been enacted into law: West Virginia has adopted a child
52
custody law patterned after it.
48.
See Melli & Brown, supra note 39, at 568.
49.
Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody under Chapter Two of the
American Law Institute's Principlesof the Law of Family Dissolution, 9 DuKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'y 304 (2001); Herma Kay, supra note 9, at 38; Kathy T. Graham, Child Custody in
the New Millennium: The ALI's Proposed Model Contrasted with Oregon's Law, 35
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 523 (1999).
50.
Brinig, supra note 49, at 304.
51.
Kay, supra note 9, at 38.
52.
W. VA. CODE § 48-9-101 et seq. (2003); John D. Athey, Note, The Ramifications of West Virginia's Codified Child Custody Law: A Departurefrom Garska v. McCoy,
106 W. VA. L. REV. 389 (2004).
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Given all these positive factors, the point that this article makes is that
the proposal would have been even better for family law if it had clearly
recognized that the new standard would probably result in an increase in
shared parenting and had addressed some of the issues associated with that
form of custody arrangement.

